

Public Health Association of Australia Member Factsheet: Australia's two-way arms trade with Israel

This document is intended as a background public health briefing based on publicly available reporting and does not constitute a Public Health Association of Australia (PHAA) policy position or independent legal assessment. The document has been developed by members of the PHAA Gaza Public Health Informal Working Group during 2025-26 consequent to the Special Resolution on Gaza passed at the 2025 PHAA AGM. It is based on available information as at June 2026.

PHAA's interest in this issue relates specifically to the public health and humanitarian impacts of armed conflict, including impacts on civilian mortality, health systems, displacement, food security and access to healthcare. This subject raises significant public health and humanitarian concerns relevant to PHAA's interest in the health impacts of armed conflict, including Australia's role in arms trade connected to the conflict and its associated public health and humanitarian impacts.

Since 2023 the conflict in Gaza has resulted in the deaths of at least [70,000 people](#) as reported in May 2026, including more than 20,000 children. These figures [likely resemble a significant underreporting of deaths](#).

This factsheet outlines the extent of Australia's two-way arms trade with Israel and the Australian Government's investment of public money in weapons companies linked to military operations associated with the conflict in Gaza and the Occupied Palestine Territories generally. The evidence presented below documents Australia's military trade, procurement and investment links connected to companies involved in such military operations. On this subject, the [PHAA Special Resolution on Gaza](#) (September 2025) specifically advocates that the Australian Government halt the supply of weapons and weapon components used by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

The [UN Arms Trade Treaty \(2013\)](#) prohibits transfers of conventional weapons by States, where a State has knowledge these weapons will be used in genocide, crimes against humanity or certain war crimes. It requires States to deny exports where there is an overriding risk that they could contribute to serious violations of international humanitarian or human rights law.

These states of knowledge are engaged by the October 2025 report from the [United Nations Special Rapporteur](#), which found that States maintaining military, diplomatic and economic relations with Israel will have "facilitated, legitimized and eventually normalized" Israel's genocide in Gaza – actions which the UN Special Rapporteur argued may contribute to breaches of international humanitarian law.

Further, in September 2025, the [United Nations Commission of Inquiry](#) reported findings relating to alleged genocide in Gaza. It identified that the [Israel Defense Forces aim](#) to destroy, in whole or in part, the Palestinian people of Gaza via "mass bombardment, total destruction of infrastructure, high death rates, a strategy that constituted a war crime". It found that there is "no military necessity to justify the pattern of its conduct". Earlier, in November 2024, the [International](#)

[Criminal Court](#) issued warrants for the arrests of Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel, and Yoav Gallant, Minister of Defence of Israel, relating to crimes against humanity.

What lethal weapons and components of lethal weapons is Australia sending to Israel?

The Australian Government has repeatedly [claimed](#) that "Australia does not supply weapons or parts of weapons to Israel" and that exports are only for "non-lethal" components or items sent for repair.

Israel operates one of the world's largest F-35 fighter jet fleets. A [June 2024 UN report](#) confirmed that Israeli F-35 jets, made with parts from partner countries including Australia, were used in military operations in Gaza associated with large-scale civilian harm and destruction. When questioned on [ABC Insiders](#) in August 2025, Defence Minister Richard Marles argued that component parts are "a separate issue".

Investigative reporting referenced in Senate Estimates has revealed an [extensive direct F-35 fighter jet parts pipeline from Australia to Israel](#). The report documented that Australia shipped 68 F-35 fighter jet parts directly to Israel between October 2023 and September 2025, with shipments spiking immediately after October 7, 2023, and being made as recently as September 2025. Its examination of shipping records found that at least 51 of these shipments were sent to Nevatim Airbase, home to Israel's three F-35 squadrons, with records showing critical operational parts, including rudder tie-rods, infrared countermeasure actuators, and 17 specialised pilot helmet display visors.

Further supply of Australian produced components for F-35 fighter jets occurs through US-based defence and aerospace company Lockheed Martin, which coordinates at least [70 Australian companies involved in the supply chain](#). On October 30, 2023 an [Australian Department of Defence](#) announced that these 70 companies had been awarded "over \$4.13 billion in global production and sustainment contracts through the F-35 program". Among these Australian companies, in 2019, the [Nupress Group](#) (Newcastle, NSW) signed a 7-year contract under which it anticipated supplying 50% of the global supply of five engine components for the F-35 program prime contractor Pratt & Whitney. According to the Department of Defence, Rosebank Engineering (Melbourne, VIC) provided "critical support" within the supply chain, as the sole global producer of "uplock actuators" which open and close the fighter jet's bay doors as it drops bombs.

In November 2025 the Australian Defence Department introduced a [ban on some military goods exports to Israel](#), however, a month prior the Department of Defence reported to Parliament that [22 permits with Israeli end-users](#) had been issued since October 2023 and continue to be reviewed. The coordination of Australian suppliers to the F-35 fighter jet production and maintenance through Lockheed Martin is ongoing.

Further evidence of Australian-made arms exported to Israel includes:

Government data from February 2024 [showed](#) that \$1.5 million of 'arms and ammunition' were

exported directly to Israel in that month alone, and \$10 million had been exported in the five years prior. Publicly available data does not disclose the precise nature of the exported items.

[Electro Optic Systems](#) (EOS) (Canberra, ACT) produces the R400 counter-drone weapons system. The weapons are sent to Israel through EOS's wholly owned US subsidiary.

[SMASH Australia](#) (Canberra, ACT) exports the remote controlled Smash Hopper gun to Israel, which is designed for precision targeting against moving aerial targets.

[Bisalloy Steel](#) (Wollongong, NSW) manufactures quenched and tempered steel, and armoured steel, up to 50mm thick, which it [exports directly to Israel](#). The steel is used to structurally reinforce IDF armoured vehicle roofs, which are equipped with mounted weapons. Bisalloy's role in Israel's arms supply chain is foundational, given it is one of two manufacturers of steel with these qualities in the southern hemisphere. In 2024, Chief Executive Rowan Melrose stated that up to [1.9% of the company's annual profits](#) had been generated in its dealing with Israeli companies.

[Droneshield](#) (Sydney, NSW) produces the DroneGun Mk4 and RfPatrol body-worn detection device. The DroneGun disrupts and shuts down enemy drones with electric jamming signals.

[Rheinmetall NIOA Munitions](#) (Maryborough, QLD) manufactures munitions including 120mm shells as part of a joint venture with German company Rheinmetall. The Queensland Treasurer confirmed in response to a [formal question on notice](#) that "...all current production from the Rheinmetall NIOA Munitions facility in Maryborough will assist RWM [Rheinmetall Waffe Munition]...". By January 2024, Israel had issued [200 requests](#) for German armoured vehicles and munitions, including 10,000 120mm Rheinmetall shells, which Germany "prioritized", depleting existing stock and requiring increased production across its international supply chain — of which the Australian company is part.

A range of Australian goods [exported to Israel](#) are classified as dual-use items under Australia's [Defence and Strategic Goods List](#). These exported goods include: body armour, iron and steel, electronics and communication equipment, satellite modems, tunnelling machinery parts, aircraft parts, engines and airfield mounting tiles, and fibre optic cables.

What is Australia buying from Israeli weapons companies linked to military operations in Gaza?

[Elbit Systems](#) is Israel's largest privately-owned arms company. It produces 85% of the drones and land-based military equipment used by the IDF, including the [Hermes 450 drone](#) that [killed Australian aid worker Zomi Frankcom](#) and her colleagues in 2024. The company produces and has actively marketed [white phosphorus munitions](#) and white phosphorus replacement shells to [international buyers](#), describing its artillery ammunition portfolio as "[combat-proven](#)". While [not explicitly banned under international law](#), customary international humanitarian law and, for states party to it, Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (Israel is not a party) requires it be used in a way that avoids as much as possible civilian injury and death.

Elbit Systems' technology and weaponry are also central to expanding and maintaining Israeli settlements in Palestinian territories, and its surveillance technology and drone systems have been referenced in reporting relating to alleged breaches of international humanitarian law.

Concerns have been raised regarding the Australian Government's provision of public funding to companies involved in military supply chains associated with the Gaza conflict. Since October 7, 2023 and the escalation of military operations in Gaza, Australian taxpayers' money has funded:

- a [\\$917 million contract for Hanwha Defence Australia with Elbit Systems integration](#) to build gun turrets
- [eight direct contracts](#) between Elbit and the Australian Department of Defence since October 2023, totalling approximately \$20 million
- [an additional \\$9.7 million](#) to Elbit Systems UK.

Overall, from 2007 to May 2025, [taxpayers have paid](#) more than \$1.9 billion to Elbit Systems in direct contracts with the Australian Department of Defence.

How are Australia's sovereign wealth funds connected to companies involved in military supply chains?

Public reporting and [civil society organisations](#) have examined Australia's investment holdings in companies linked to military supply chains associated with the conflict. [Documents obtained under FOI](#) revealed that as of October 2023, the Future Fund held more than \$650 million across 30 weapons and aerospace companies, including Lockheed Martin and Elbit Systems. As of December 2023, the fund held a combined \$74.7 million in Elbit Systems, Lockheed Martin and Palantir Technologies — three companies named in a [UN Special Rapporteur report](#) on corporate entities contributing to the conflict.

By December 2025, according to the [Future Fund's own periodic investment disclosures](#) and [AAP reporting](#), holdings in Palantir Technologies had risen to \$165.3 million (+2348%) and Elbit to \$8.6 million (+1470%). Increased Elbit holdings were also recorded across other government-managed funds, including a 263% increase in the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land and Sea Future Fund and \$108,907 in the Housing Australia Future Fund at the end of 2024, [according to analysis of the fund's public disclosures](#).

In contrast, the largest sovereign wealth fund in the world, Norway's Government Pension Fund Global, [banned investment in Elbit Systems](#) in 2009 and in 2025 [terminated all contracts](#) with asset managers handling its Israeli investments.

This fact sheet has been produced by members of the PHAA (not the association itself). It is based on publicly available information and statements from credible sources, including government disclosures and UN reports. It should not be interpreted as alleging unlawful conduct by any person or entity unless explicitly cited from a legal ruling or official finding. References to international legal findings are included for contextual purposes and should not be interpreted as PHAA making independent legal determinations. Last updated: 15/07/2026.